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ABSTRACT 
In Horne v. Department of Agriculture, the Supreme Court 
recently held that the government could not assess a fine on a raisin 
grower for refusing to surrender a portion of his crop in compliance 
with a government program to artificially inflate the price of raisins, 
benefitting raisin producers. The Court was split, with Justice 
Sotomayor strongly opposed to the entire decision and Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan dissenting in part. Interestingly, only a 
very brief concurring opinion written by Justice Thomas touched on 
the strongest foundation for the majority’s result—in order for a 
justly compensated taking to be constitutional, it must be for a public 
use, and clearly a program designed to benefit the narrow class of 
raisin growers at higher costs and lower raisin availability for the 
public is not a public use. This Article analogizes the price support 
program to a government-created cartel that increases prices to 
confer a private benefit on producers. Such programs are bad policy 
and in some cases unconstitutional. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Horne v. Department of Agriculture,1 the Supreme Court 
recently held that the government could not assess a fine on a raisin 
grower for refusing to surrender a portion of his crop in compliance 
with a government program to artificially inflate the price of raisins, 
benefitting raisin producers.2 The Court was split, with Justice 
Sotomayor strongly opposed to the entire decision3 and Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan dissenting in part.4 Interestingly, only a 
very brief concurring opinion written by Justice Thomas touched on 
what I consider the strongest foundation for the majority’s result—in 
order for a justly compensated taking to be constitutional, it must be 
for a public use, and clearly a program designed to benefit the 
narrow class of raisin growers at higher costs and lower raisin 
availability for the public is not a public use.5 
                                                 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
 2. See id. at 2431 (“Raisins are not like oysters: they are private 
property—the fruit of the growers’ labor—not ‘public things subject to the absolute 
control of the state’ . . . . Any physical taking of them for public use must be 
accompanied by just compensation.”) (quoting Leonard v. Earle, 141 A. 714, 716 
(1928) (internal citation omitted)). 
 3. See id. at 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I would affirm the 
judgment of the Ninth Circuit.”). 
 4. See id. at 2433 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I 
agree with Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion. However, I cannot agree with the 
Court’s rejection, in Part III, of the Government’s final argument.”). 
 5. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote: 
The Takings Clause prohibits the government from taking private 
property except “for public use,” even when it offers “just 
compensation.” That requirement, as originally understood, imposes 
a meaningful constraint on the power of the state—“the government 
may take property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal 
right to use the property.” It is far from clear that the Raisin 
Administrative Committee’s conduct meets that standard. It takes 
the raisins of citizens and, among other things, gives them away or 
sells them to exporters, foreign importers, and foreign governments. 
To the extent that the Committee is not taking the raisins “for public 
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This Article will describe the raisin price-support program and 
analyze the legal arguments made in Horne. It will also provide an 
economic analysis explaining why price support programs such as 
this are unequivocally poor policy.  
In a world where there is only a finite supply of all resources, 
prices adjust to equilibrate the quantity supplied with the quantity 
demanded.6 When people desire a quantity greater than that in 
supply, prices will rise providing incentives to supply more and also 
causing people to desire less until equilibrium is restored.7 Shortages 
thus create price increases.8 When the quantity available in supply 
exceeds the amount people desire, prices will drop creating an 
incentive to reduce production of the service or commodity and also 
causing people to increase their consumption of the good until 
equilibrium is restored.9 Thus, surpluses cause price decreases.10 
Throughout history, governments have attempted to manipulate 
prices much as they have attempted to manipulate flowing water.11 
Attempts to manipulate flowing water have often resulted in large-
scale problems.12 Attempts to manipulate prices have been even more 
unsuccessful.13 Two kinds of manipulation are possible. Price 
ceilings are designed to keep the prices of certain commodities or 
                                                                                                       
use,” having the Court of Appeals calculate “just compensation” in 
this case would be a fruitless exercise. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 6. See R. GLENN HUBBARD & ANTHONY P. O’BRIEN, MICROECONOMICS 82 
(4th ed. 2013) (explaining that the equilibrium price causes the quantity supplied to 
equal the quantity demanded). 
 7. See id. at 83 (“A higher price will simultaneously increase the quantity 
supplied and decrease the quantity demanded.”). 
 8. See id. (observing that shortages create upward pressure on price). 
 9. See id. (“When there is a surplus, firms have unsold goods piling up, 
which gives them an incentive to increase their sales by cutting the price. Cutting the 
price will simultaneously increase the quantity demanded and decrease the quantity 
supplied.”). 
 10. See id. (observing that surpluses create downward pressure on price). 
 11. See id. at 109 (“Producers or consumers who are dissatisfied with the 
competitive equilibrium price can lobby the government to legally require that a 
different price be charged. In the United States, the government only occasionally 
overrides the market outcome by setting prices.”). 
 12. See Greg Shimokawa, America’s Infrastructure: Can We Smooth Out 
the Bumpy Regulatory Road?, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 287, 292-93 (2014) 
(describing the shift in government efforts to control water for the protection of 
farmland towards protection of population growth and property development near 
water). 
 13. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 114-16 (2d ed. 
1997). 
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services low,14 and price supports are designed to keep the prices of 
certain commodities or services high.15 A common example of price 
ceilings would be rent control.16 Political leaders observe a 
“problem” that shelter is expensive and pass a law prohibiting price 
increases for existing renters.17 These politicians then claim to have 
worked to help solve the problem of affordable housing, and existing 
tenants receive the benefit of a below-market rent.18 However, these 
laws actually exacerbate housing shortages by creating a disincentive 
to invest in new housing and to maintain the existing housing stock.19 
Property owners remove their housing from the market, or they allow 
it to depreciate into dilapidated housing stock.20 Economists have 
universally condemned rent control and have attributed urban blight 
to this type of government interference in the real estate market.21 
The raisin-reserve program at the center of Horne is a price- 
support program designed to keep the price of raisins above the 
normal market equilibrium for the benefit of farmers.22 Historically 
                                                 
 14. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 112 (describing price 
ceilings). 
 15. See id. at 110 (describing price floors). 
 16. Id. at 112. 
 17. See, e.g., Gisselle Acevedo & Paul Freese, Officials Should Fight for 
Affordable Housing, DAILY NEWS L.A., Mar. 4, 2008, at A11 (arguing that high 
housing costs are a problem that should be dealt with by enforcing rent control). 
 18. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 115 (“The winners with rent 
control are the people who are paying less for rent because they live in rent-
controlled apartments.”). 
 19. See id. at 112-13. Professors Hubbard and O’Brien explain: 
The fall in the quantity of apartments supplied can be the result of 
landlords converting some apartments into offices, selling some off as 
condominiums, or converting some small apartment buildings into 
single-family homes. Over time, landlords may even abandon some 
apartment buildings. At one time in New York City, rent control 
resulted in landlords abandoning whole city blocks because they were 
unable to cover their costs with the rents the government allowed them 
to charge. 
Id. 
 20. See id. at 113 (“In London, when rent controls were applied to rooms 
and apartments located in a landlord’s own home, the quantity of these apartments 
supplied dropped by 75 percent.”). 
 21. See Mark Klock, Financial Options, Real Options, and Legal Options: 
Opting to Exploit Ourselves and What We Can Do About It, 55 ALA. L. REV. 63, 106 
(2003) (“We know that permitting tenants to rent at below-market rates both causes 
housing shortages and dilapidation of neighborhoods.”). 
 22. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The reserve requirement is intended, at 
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in the United States, farmers were a politically important power 
center and succeeded in institutionalizing some devices to give 
farmers political power that exceeds their proportional size.23 For 
example, two Senators per state gives Wyoming ranchers a voice in 
the Senate proportional with New York that disproportionately 
exaggerates the political power of rural states.24 When Congress 
created the Federal Reserve Bank system, Missouri was made the 
only state to house two Federal Reserve banks.25 This was a blatant 
effort to appease the farming community into accepting the Federal 
Reserve System.26 
The political power of the farming community has perpetuated 
a powerful interest that established and maintained price-support 
programs to benefit farmers at the expense of consumers supporting 
high prices for milk, cheese, corn, sugar, beets and other crops.27 
                                                                                                       
least in part, to enhance the price that free-tonnage raisins will fetch on the open 
market.”). 
 23. For example, there are just twelve Federal Reserve districts, each with a 
main Federal Reserve bank, and Missouri—an important farming state—is the only 
state that is home to two Federal Reserve banks, one in St. Louis and one in Kansas 
City. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN & STANLEY G. EAKINS, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
INSTITUTIONS 194 (7th ed. 2012). 
 24. See Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809, 824 n.72 
(1995) (“This sort of geographic apportionment gives more sparsely populated 
states—that is, relatively rural states—a lopsided advantage in the Senate.”). 
 25. See ANTHONY SAUNDERS & MARCIA CORNETT, FINANCIAL MARKETS 
AND INSTITUTIONS 95 (4th ed. 2009) (map depicting the twelve Federal Reserve 
districts).  
 26. Cf. Sarah Binder & Mark Spindel, De-Central Bank: The Politics of 
Selecting the Federal Reserve Banks in 1914, Paper Presented at the Congress and 
History Conference 12, BROWN UNIV. (June 9, 2011), https://www.brown.edu/ 
conference/congress-and-history/files/uploads/binder_spindel_june_2011.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/QC6W-BPSC] (“[G]iven the perception of the Federal Reserve as the 
brainchild of a Democratic president and Congress, the Democratic RBOC had a 
strong incentive to dole out reserve banks with an eye to currying the support of 
Republicans . . . .”). 
 27. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 111. The professors explain: 
The federal government’s farm programs have often resulted in large 
surpluses of wheat and other agricultural products. In response, the 
government has usually either bought the surplus food or paid farmers 
to restrict supply by taking some land out of cultivation. Because both 
of these options are expensive, Congress passed the Freedom to Farm 
Act of 1996. The intent of the act was to phase out price floors and 
government purchases of surpluses and return to a free market in 
agriculture. To allow farmers time to adjust, the federal government 
began paying farmers subsidies, or cash payments based on the number 
of acres planted. Although the subsidies were originally scheduled to be 
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Before delving into greater detail about the mischief created by 
agricultural price supports, it is useful to have a brief primer on 
economics. 
II. MICROECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 
One simple definition of economics is that economics is the 
study of decision-making under the condition of scarce resources.28 
Scarce is simply a synonym for finite.29 With infinite resources, 
households would not have to make any difficult decisions as there 
would be an abundance of everything and people could have more of 
anything they desired without sacrificing anything at all.30 Obviously 
this would be nirvana, and nirvana does not exist on earth.31 When 
resources are scarce, obtaining more of one thing necessarily entails 
giving up something else.32 For example, increasing the production 
of pistachios would require more water for more pistachio trees and 
would mean less available water for other agricultural products.33 
                                                                                                       
phased out, Congress has passed additional Farm Acts that have resulted 
in the continuation of subsidies. 
Id.
 28. See id. at 4 (“Economics is the study of the choices consumers, business 
managers, and government officials make to attain their goals, given their scarce 
resources.”). 
 29. See id. (explaining that choices based on scarcity are the inevitable 
result of finite resources).  
 30. See Mark Klock, Contrasting the Art of Economic Science with Pseudo-
Economic Nonsense: The Distinction Between Reasonable Assumptions and 
Ridiculous Assumptions, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 153, 160 (2010) (“If both investors have 
infinite wealth, they would have no incentive to trade regardless of their beliefs. 
They would not have to make any choices. They could have everything without 
sacrificing anything.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Susannah T. French, Judicial Review of the Administrative 
Record in NEPA Litigation, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 971 n.244 (1993) (“The notion 
of complete representativeness is an illusion, a version of nirvana. It does not exist, 
because it cannot.” (quoting LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION 323 (1965))). 
 32. See Klock, supra note 30, at 157 (“For a model to be part of the subject 
matter of economics, the decision makers must make sacrifices. That is, they must 
choose between alternatives.”). 
 33. See Todd C. Frankel, California’s Next Big Drought Crisis - 
Groundwater - Lurks Below Surface, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2015, at A4 (“Farmers 
have planted more water-intensive, high-profit crops, with pistachios and almonds 
needing extensive watering.”). 
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Under conditions of scarcity, there are many feasible models 
for allocating the scarce resources.34 A central authority could make 
resource allocation decisions, and resources could be rationed.35 An 
alternative and well-known model for allocation of resources is the 
competitive free-market economy.36 In this environment the pricing 
mechanism works to allocate scarce resources in the most efficient 
manner.37 Scarcer and more desired resources command a higher 
price, and more abundant and less desirable resources trade at lower 
prices.38 
The pricing mechanism works to equilibrate the quantity of 
goods that households demand with the quantity that firms supply.39 
If there is disequilibrium, then there is either an excess supply or an 
excess demand.40 An excess demand means a shortage of goods, 
which will put upward pressure on prices.41 As prices rise, firms will 
                                                 
 34. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 11-12 (8th ed. 
2010) (“[W]e described the equilibrium for apartments in a competitive market. But 
this is only one of many ways to allocate a resource . . . .”). 
 35. See id. at 13-14 (describing a situation in which government dictates a 
maximum price that results in rationing). 
 36. See id. at 14 (listing a competitive equilibrium as one method for 
resource allocation). 
 37. See id. at 16 (“The outcome of the competitive market is Pareto 
efficient.”). 
 38. See STIGLITZ, supra note 13, at 152. Professor Stiglitz writes: 
If the price of oil is high, it is because oil is scarce and the high price 
reflects that scarcity. . . . [E]conomists regard such situations not as 
market failures but as the hard facts of economic life. Much as everyone 
would like to live in a world where all individuals could have almost 
everything they wanted at a price they could afford, this is simply 
unrealistic. Those calling on government to “solve” the problem of 
scarcity by passing laws about prices simply shift the problem. They 
reduce prices for some and cause shortages for everyone else. 
Id.
 39. See VARIAN, supra note 34, at 3 (“Prices adjust until the amount that 
people demand of something is equal to the amount that is supplied.”). 
 40. See id. at 8 (explaining what happens if the market price is not in 
equilibrium). 
 41. See id. Professor Varian describes the situation where price is below the 
equilibrium price: 
At this price at least some of the landlords will have more renters than 
they can handle. There will be lines of people hoping to get an 
apartment at that price; there are more people who are ailing to pay the 
price p than there are apartments. Certainly some of the landlords would 
find it in their interest to raise the price of the apartments they are 
offering. 
Id. at 7. 
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have an incentive to increase the quantity supplied and households 
will be incentivized to lower the quantity demanded.42 This continues 
until the quantities supplied and demanded are again in equilibrium.43 
If there is an excess supply, then there will be downward pressure on 
price giving households an incentive to demand more and firms will 
be incentivized to supply less.44 
To provide a little more background on this, a necessary 
condition for optimal decision-making requires either that the rate at 
which an individual can substitute goods exactly equal the rate that 
the individual is willing to substitute goods or that the individual 
consume a quantity of zero for one of the goods.45 For example, 
suppose that I like both apples and pears but I like pears twice as 
much as apples, so I am only willing to give up one pear for two 
apples or two apples for one pear. If the price of pears is $1, and the 
price of apples is 50 cents, then I am in equilibrium whatever my 
consumption of pears and apples is because I am unable to make a 
reallocation that improves my welfare. The rate at which I am 
willing to substitute apples for pears is exactly equal to the rate at 
which I can substitute apples for pears.46 A reallocation (holding my 
total expenditure on pears and apples fixed) will leave me equally 
well off but not better off. However, if the price ratio is anything 
other than two apples for one pear, I would be able to improve my 
welfare by trading all my apples for pears if the price of pears was 
less than double apples or all my pears for apples if the price of pears 
was more than double apples.47 
In reality, the rate at which I am willing to trade apples for 
pears is not likely to be constant because of something economists 
                                                 
 42. See id. at 294 (“[A] price that is not an equilibrium price cannot be 
expected to persist since at least some agents would have an incentive to change 
their behavior.”). 
 43. See id. (“[T]he market price will be pushed up to the point where 
demand and supply are equal.”). 
 44. See id. (“Thus excess supply exerts a downward pressure on the market 
price.”). 
 45. See id. at 76 (“If the optimal choice involves consuming some of both 
goods—so that it is an interior optimum—then necessarily the indifference curve 
will be tangent to the budget line.”). 
 46. See id. at 78 (“If the consumer is at a consumption bundle where he or 
she is willing to stay put, it must be one where the MRS is equal to this rate of 
exchange: MRS = െ݌ଵ ݌ଶൗ .”). 
 47. See id. (“Whenever the MRS is different from the price ratio, the 
consumer cannot be at his or her optimal choice.”). 
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call diminishing marginal utility.48 As I consume more and more 
apples, I value the next one less and less, which means that if I eat a 
lot of apples I might be willing to sacrifice a greater number of 
apples for an occasional pear.49 Understanding diminishing marginal 
utility is not really important for the point of this paper. The 
important point is that at any price level, everyone makes decisions 
that put them in equilibrium. Then if the relative price changes, 
people will consume more of the now relatively less expensive 
product and less of the relatively more expensive product.50 
Additionally, the concept of marginal is frequently invoked in 
economics.51 Marginal is simply economic language for the 
incremental change.52 In economics, decisions are made at the 
margin, or with respect to small changes in profit, utility, or other 
variables.53  
The concept of marginal rate of substitution now allows us to 
construct a demand schedule. A demand schedule shows the quantity 
of a good that people will want to purchase at a given price.54 People 
will demand a low quantity at high prices.55 As the price falls, the 
quantity people demand increases as people can afford more and will 
consume more of the lower priced good.56 Traditionally economists 
graph this schedule with price on the vertical axis and quantity on the 
                                                 
 48. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 311 (explaining the concept 
of diminishing marginal utility). 
 49. See id. (“For nearly every good or service, the more you consume 
during a period of time, the less you increase your total satisfaction from each 
additional unit you consume.”). 
 50. See id. at 317 (explaining the substitution effect resulting from a change 
in relative prices). 
 51. See id. at 7 (explaining that “optimal decisions are made at the 
margin”). 
 52. See VARIAN, supra note 34, at A4 (“Typically ǻx will refer to a small 
change in x. We sometimes express this by saying that ǻx represents a marginal 
change.”). 
 53. Cf. HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 7 (“[M]ost decisions in life 
involve doing a little more or a little less.”). 
 54. Id. at 70. 
 55. See id. at 71 (“[C]onsumers will buy . . . less of a good when the price 
rises . . . .”). 
 56. See id. (“Buyers demand a larger quantity of a product as the price falls 
because the product becomes less expensive relative to other products and because 
they can afford to buy more at a lower price.”). 
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horizontal axis.57 Thus, the demand schedule slopes downward as in 
Figure 1.58 
 
Figure 1. Supply and Demand 
The supply schedule shows the quantity of a good that firms 
will want to produce at a given price.59 The profit-maximizing 
necessary condition for firms is that marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost.60 If marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost, 
then producing more will increase profit.61 If marginal revenue is less 
than marginal cost, then producing less will increase profit.62 For a 
perfectly competitive firm, marginal revenue is equal to price so 
increasing prices translates into a higher quantity supplied.63 An 
upward sloping supply schedule is also depicted in Figure 1.  
                                                 
 57. See KARL E. CASE, RAY C. FAIR & SHARON M. OSTER, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS 51 (10th ed. 2012) (“[Q]uantity (q) is measured along the horizontal 
axis and price (P) is measured along the vertical axis.”). 
 58. Id. at 52. 
 59. Id. at 61. 
 60. Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. 
REV. 317, 321 (2002). 
 61. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 183 (3d ed. 
1984) (“[I]f a unit increment of output will increase revenue more than it does cost 
. . . then the increment should be produced; we are not yet at the profit-maximizing 
output.”). 
 62. See id. (“If [marginal revenue is less than marginal cost], on the other 
hand, the last unit caused a decrease in profit so that output has been pushed beyond 
the optimum.”). 
 63. See WILLIAM S. BROWN, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 267 (1995) (“This is 
important: for a pure competitive firm, marginal revenue is equal to selling price.”). 
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Equilibrium then occurs at the price for which the quantity 
supplied equals the quantity demanded.64 Any shock to the system 
creating an excess supply or an excess demand will result in a price 
adjustment to restore equilibrium.65 Thus, competitive market prices 
are the mechanism by which resources are channeled to their highest-
valued use.66 
One important concept in welfare economics is the concept of 
Pareto optimality.67 A resource allocation is said to be Pareto optimal 
(or Pareto efficient) if no individual can be made better off without 
making someone else worse off.68 If it is possible to improve the 
welfare of someone without making someone else worse off, the 
allocation is Pareto inferior.69 Pareto inferior allocations imply that 
resources are being wasted or not put to their highest-valued use.70 
Obviously, Pareto inferior allocations are undesirable.71 Fortunately, 
two important theorems of welfare economics are first, that every 
competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient,72 and second, that any 
Pareto efficient allocation can be achieved via a competitive 
equilibrium.73 These theorems explain why economists frequently 
prefer market forces to political forces.74 
                                                 
 64. See Klock, supra note 60, at 320 (“Equilibrium requires that markets 
clear, or that supply equals demand.”). 
 65. See VARIAN, supra note 34, at 7-8 (explaining why a nonequilibrium 
price cannot persist). 
 66. See id. at 16 (explaining that a competitive market equilibrium assigns 
resources to those who place the highest value on them). 
 67. See id. at 15 (“One useful criterion for comparing the outcomes of 
different economic institutions is a concept known as Pareto efficiency or economic 
efficiency.”). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. (“If there is a way to make someone better off without hurting 
anyone else, why not do it?”). 
 72. See EUGENE SILBERBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMICS: A 
MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS 480 (1978) (“The first theorem is that perfect 
competition leads to a Pareto-optimal allocation of goods and services.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 73. See id. at 481 (“The second ‘theorem’ of classical welfare economics is 
the statement that there is an allocation under perfect competition for any overall 
Pareto optimum.”). 
 74. See RICHARD W. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMATIVE THEORY 4 
(1981) (“[T]he competitive market economy is seen as the ideal economic system, 
so much so that competitive market failure is a necessary condition for public sector 
activity.”). 
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Another measure of consumer welfare is called consumer 
surplus.75 Consumer surplus is the difference between what 
consumers would have been willing to pay for each unit of a good 
(the area under the demand curve) and the amount that they actually 
pay in a competitive market equilibrium.76 Consumer surplus is 
represented as the shaded area depicted in Figure 2. It is easily 
demonstrated that competitive market equilibrium maximizes 
consumer surplus.77 
 
Figure 2. Consumer Surplus 
Now, suppose that rather than allowing the market to set a 
competitive price, politicians opt to set the price. If they happen to 
set the price at the same level as the competitive market would have, 
there is no problem.78 However, if they set the price at any other 
level, they will necessarily create either shortages or surpluses, and 
in either case they will lower the economic surplus.79 The resulting 
allocation will necessarily be Pareto inferior, meaning that it will be 
possible to improve the welfare of someone without making anyone 
                                                 
 75. EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY/APPLICATIONS 100 (6th 
ed. 1988) (“Consumer’s surplus is a measure of the net benefit received by the 
consumer.”).  
 76. Id. at 100-01. 
 77. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 500 (“Equilibrium in a 
perfectly competitive market results in the greatest amount of economic surplus . . . .” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 78. Cf. VARIAN, supra note 34, at 13-14 (assuming that rent control prices 
are set below the competitive market equilibrium price). 
 79. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 109 (“Anything that causes 
the market for a good or service not to be in competitive equilibrium reduces the 
total benefit to society from the production of that good or service.”).
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else worse off.80 The Pareto inferior allocation results from a 
noncompetitive equilibrium price because either scarce resources are 
being spent on less valued goods or scarce resources are prevented 
from flowing into more valued goods.81 This can be illustrated by 
considering the special cases of government-set price ceilings and 
price supports. 
Consider the case of a price ceiling first. Suppose some people 
complain that housing is too expensive and that they cannot afford 
their rent. Politicians seeking votes might consider bestowing favors 
upon potential voters by promising rent controls—government 
enforced laws to keep the price of rental property from going above a 
certain level.82 There are two possibilities. First, the politicians could 
set the price ceiling at or above the competitive market equilibrium 
in which case the constraint is not binding and the market price 
prevails.83 The second possibility is, of course, that the politicians set 
the ceiling below the competitive market equilibrium in which case 
they have created a shortage of housing.84 They are bestowing on a 
select group (usually existing renters staying put) an opportunity to 
consume a good below-market price, while making housing 
unavailable to others.85 The result is illustrated in Figure 3. 
                                                 
 80. See VARIAN, supra note 34, at 17 (discussing Pareto improvements 
under rent control).
 81. See id. (explaining that rent control results in resources being allocated 
to lesser valued uses). 
 82. R. GLENN HUBBARD, ANNE GARNETT & PHIL LEWIS, ESSENTIALS OF 
ECONOMICS 124 (2d ed. 2013) (“Occasionally, however, consumers succeed in 
having the government impose a price ceiling, which is a legally determined 
maximum price that sellers may charge. Rent control is an example of a price 
ceiling.”). 
 83. See id. at 130-31 (“To affect the market outcome the government must 
set a price floor that is above the equilibrium price, or set a price ceiling that is 
below the equilibrium price. Otherwise, the price ceiling or price floor will not be 
binding on buyers and sellers.”). 
 84. See VARIAN, supra note 34, at 14 (noting that this situation will create 
excess demand meaning that there will be a shortage of units at the legal price). 
 85. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 115 (“The winners with rent 
control are the people who are paying less for rent because they live in rent-
controlled apartments. . . . The losers from rent control are the . . . renters who are 
unable to find apartments to rent at the controlled price.”). 
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Figure 3. Price Ceiling 
The allocation is no longer Pareto optimal because there are 
displaced potential renters who value the existing stock of rental 
housing at a higher value than some of the existing renters.86 Side 
deals could potentially be made where both groups could be made 
better off simultaneously.87 This is economically inefficient, but there 
is also a set of even uglier secondary effects. The rent control laws 
create a disincentive to invest in additional housing stock that could 
alleviate the shortage.88 Instead, the incentive that is created is to 
disinvest, which in the case of a fixed stock of housing means to 
allow the property to depreciate and fall into disrepair—further 
exacerbating the shortage.89 This is a major cause of urban decay.90 
Further, the shortage of housing in the rent-controlled city pushes 
people to live in neighboring jurisdictions without rent control and 
pushes the rents up in those jurisdictions.91 This further exacerbates 
                                                 
 86. See id. at 114 (“Because rent controls cause a shortage of apartments, 
desperate tenants are often willing to pay landlords rents that are higher than the law 
allows . . . .”). 
 87. See VARIAN, supra note 34, at 16. Professor Varian explains this 
concept: 
Suppose that we think of all voluntary trades as being carried out so that 
all gains from trade are exhausted. The resulting allocation must be 
Pareto efficient. If not, there would be some trade that would make two 
people better off without hurting anyone else—but this would contradict 
the assumption that all voluntary trades had been carried out. 
Id.
 88. See STIGLITZ, supra note 13, at 116 (“[A]partment owners may not wish 
to construct new ones if they cannot charge enough in rent to cover their costs.”). 
 89. See id. (“Apartments may be abandoned as they deteriorate . . . .”). 
 90. See id. (“[T]he quantity of available rental housing will decrease, so that 
many would-be-residents will be unable to find rental housing in the market.”). 
 91. See The High Cost of Rent Control, NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUSING 
COUNCIL, http://www.nmhc.org/News/The-High-Cost-of-Rent-Control/ [https://perma. 
cc/73H4-F939] (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (“[T]he costs of rent controls are not 
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the problem of affordable housing, and contributes to urban sprawl 
and traffic congestion.92 
The other form of price interference common in American 
politics is the price support, which seeks to maintain price levels 
above the competitive market equilibrium.93 Though price supports 
are popular within farming communities, creating artificially high 
prices is not economically efficient.94 The California raisin reserve 
program is one of these styles of programs.95 As can be seen from 
visualizing a price floor in the graph of supply and demand in Figure 
3, a price set above the competitive market equilibrium lowers 
consumer surplus and creates an excess supply of raisins that mirrors 
the shortage created by a price ceiling.96 The government must 
dispose of the excess supply, which is wasteful, and consumers end 
up paying a higher price for fewer raisins (or other commodities) 
than they would consume under competitive market equilibrium.97  
Of course, the ugly secondary effects are there, too. The 
marginal farmers are now disincentivized to leave farming but 
continue to produce excessive amounts of the crop that is then 
                                                                                                       
confined to the political boundaries of those communities that adopt them, but often 
impose significant costs throughout regional housing markets.”). 
 92. See id. The report states: 
Consumers who would otherwise move to smaller or larger homes or 
closer to their jobs do not do so because they do not want to lose the 
subsidy. This loss of mobility can be particularly costly to families 
whose job opportunities are geographically or otherwise limited and 
who may have to travel long distances to reach those jobs available to 
them. And for the community at large—including nearby communities 
that have not themselves imposed rent control—reduced consumer 
mobility can mean increased traffic congestion and demand for city 
services, among other costs. 
Id. 
 93. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 110 (“The Great Depression 
of the 1930s was the worst economic disaster in U.S. history . . . . Farmers were able 
to convince the federal government to set price floors for many agricultural 
products. Government intervention in agriculture . . . has continued ever since.”). 
 94. See id. (“[F]armers benefit from this program, but consumers lose. . . . 
[A] price floor reduces economic efficiency.”).  
 95. See generally Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (9th 
Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (providing background on the history of 
the raisin price support program). 
 96. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 110. 
 97. See id. at 110-11. 
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disposed of by the government.98 In the competitive market 
equilibrium, less would be produced, but consumers would get more 
and pay lower prices.99 Resources would be shifted to more valuable 
uses.100 The interference with the price mechanism for allocating 
resources prevents resources from being channeled from less 
valuable uses to more valuable uses by providing a strong incentive 
to keep the resources engaged in the production of less valued 
commodities.101 One might hope that the severe water shortage in 
California would cause people to reevaluate the rationality of these 
agricultural price support programs that perpetuate the 
overproduction (and wasted water) on certain favored crops.102 That 
background will now make it easier to understand the underlying 
facts in Horne and to understand the compensation arguments of the 
Justices in their analyses of the case.  
III. THE HORNE DECISION 
A. Facts of the Case 
Under the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s California Raisin 
Order, a raisin grower must set aside a portion of his or her crop for 
the government free of charge.103 The government removes those 
raisins from the competitive market to decrease the available supply 
and artificially increase the market price of raisins for the benefit of 
raisin producers.104 The question before the Court was whether the 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits the government from 
                                                 
 98. See id. at 111 (discussing the large surpluses of agricultural products 
that have been bought by the federal government as a result of farm support 
programs). 
 99. Id. at 110. 
 100. See id. (“[T]he price floor has caused the marginal benefit of the last 
bushel of wheat to be greater than the marginal cost of producing it.”). 
 101. See EDWIN G. DOLAN, BASIC ECONOMICS 499 (3d ed. 1983) 
(“[G]enerous subsidies do not encourage the orderly withdrawal of resources from 
farming or even the orderly transfer of resources from heavily subsidized crops 
(such as wheat) to other valuable crops (such as soybeans) that traditionally pay 
their own way.”). 
 102. See Frankel, supra note 33 (“The current predicament has been 
exacerbated by decades of allowing groundwater usage to be essentially unmanaged 
. . . .”). 
 103. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015). 
 104. See id. (“The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorizes 
the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate ‘marketing orders’ to help maintain 
stable markets for particular agricultural products.”). 
Horne and the Problem of Price Supports 729 
imposing its requirement of surrendering a portion of a farmer’s 
raisin crop without just compensation.105 
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorized 
the Secretary to promulgate marketing orders to maintain stable 
markets for certain agricultural commodities.106 The Secretary also 
appointed members of the Raisin Administrative Committee, “a 
Government entity composed largely of growers and others in the 
raisin business,” who set the percentage of raisins required to be 
turned over to the government annually.107 In 2002-2003, the 
Committee set the percentage at 47%; for the next year it was 30%.108 
The raisins claimed by the government are called “reserve 
raisins,” and the remaining portion is called “free-tonnage raisins.”109 
Raisin farmers usually ship all of their raisins to a “handler” who 
then separates the free-tonnage raisins from the reserve raisins.110 The 
handlers pack and sell the free-tonnage raisins and pay the farmers 
for these.111 The Raisin Committee takes title to the reserve raisins 
and has the discretion to determine how to dispose of them.112 
According to the Court, “[The Raisin Committee] sells them in 
noncompetitive markets, for example to exporters, federal agencies, 
or foreign governments; donates them to charitable causes; releases 
them to growers who agree to reduce their raisin production; or 
disposes of them by ‘any other means’ consistent with the purposes 
of the raisin program.”113 
Chief Justice Roberts explained that: 
Proceeds from Committee sales are principally used to subsidize handlers 
who sell raisins for export (not including the Hornes, who are not raisin 
exporters). Raisin growers retain an interest in any net proceeds from sales 
the Raisin Committee makes, after deductions for the export subsidies and 
the Committee’s administrative expenses. In the years at issue in this case, 
those proceeds were less than the cost of producing the crop one year, and 
nothing at all the next.114 
                                                 
 105. Id. at 2425. 
 106. Id. at 2424.
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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The Hornes are a family that both grows raisins and handles 
raisins.115 Chief Justice Roberts described the Hornes’ conduct that 
resulted in their dispute with the government: “In 2002, the Hornes 
refused to set aside any raisins for the Government, believing they 
were not legally bound to do so. The Government sent trucks to the 
Hornes’ facility at eight o’clock one morning to pick up the raisins, 
but the Hornes refused entry.”116 The government subsequently fined 
the Hornes $480,000 based on the market value of the reserve raisins 
plus an additional civil penalty of a little more than $200,000 for 
failure to comply with the order to surrender the raisins.117 
As a defense to the fine, the Hornes argued that the raisin 
reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking.118 The 
government argued that the lower courts lacked jurisdiction to decide 
the constitutional question.119 That issue was appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which rejected the government’s contention and 
remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit to address the Hornes’ 
argument on the merits.120 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Horne family that the 
legality of the fine rode on the constitutionality of the raisin reserve 
requirement.121 According to the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit 
“considered whether that requirement was a physical appropriation 
of property, giving rise to a per se taking, or a restriction on a raisin 
grower’s use of his property, properly analyzed under the more 
flexible and forgiving standard for a regulatory taking.”122 The Ninth 
Circuit rejected the Hornes’ argument finding that the Takings 
Clause provides less protection to personal property than real 
property and holding that because growers keep an interest in the 
revenue from the sale of reserve raisins the Hornes “are not 
completely divested of their property rights.”123 
The Court of Appeals classified the reserve requirement as a 
use restriction akin to the grant of a land use permit subject to a 
government condition.124 In similar permit cases, the government 
                                                 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2425. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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imposes a condition in exchange for conferring a benefit.125 The court 
saw the reserve requirement as the condition exchanged for the 
benefit of an orderly raisin market.126 Because the Horne family 
could avoid the condition by not planting raisins, the court classified 
the reserve requirement as “a proportional response to the 
Government’s interest in ensuring an orderly raisin market, and not a 
taking under the Fifth Amendment.”127 The Hornes appealed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari.128 
B. The Majority Opinion
The Court held the raisin reserve requirement to be an 
unconstitutional per se taking and excused the Hornes’ fine.129 Chief 
Justice Roberts delivered the majority opinion, which Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito fully joined.130 Justice Thomas also 
wrote a brief concurring opinion to add an additional point consistent 
with the holding.131 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan concurred 
with most of the majority’s analysis, but dissented from the final 
argument and the result.132 Justice Sotomayor dissented from all of 
the majority’s holdings.133 
The Court made four inquiries.134 The first inquiry was whether 
the government’s categorical duty to provide just compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment when there has been a physical taking of 
property applied only to real property and not personal property.135 
The Court answered no.136 The second question was whether the 
government may avoid the duty to pay just compensation “by 
reserving to the property owner a contingent interest in a portion of 
the value of the property, set at the government’s discretion.”137 The 
                                                 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. at 2433 (“[T]he Hornes should simply be relieved of the 
obligation to pay the fine and associated civil penalty they were assessed when they 
resisted the Government’s effort to take their raisins.”). 
 130. Id. at 2423. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 2425-32 (discussing four questions presented). 
 135. Id. at 2425. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 2428. 
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Court answered no to this.138 Third, the Court asked “[w]hether a 
governmental mandate to relinquish specific, identifiable property as 
a ‘condition’ on permission to engage in commerce effects a per se 
taking.”139 The Court answered yes,140 and the partial dissent agreed 
with the majority on all three of these questions.141 
The final argument, where the Court split more deeply, was 
whether the benefit of better market prices for the free-tonnage 
raisins might provide adequate compensation for taking the reserve 
raisins.142 The partial dissent argued that the case should be remanded 
for a determination of this question.143 The majority believed the law 
of just compensation would require fair market value at the time of 
the taking.144  
The majority set the tone for its analysis of this case with the 
first question.145 Is the raisin reserve requirement a government 
taking of property (per se) or a mere land use restriction (a regulatory 
taking)?146 The Court found this to be a simple question.147 Quoting 
from Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, the Court stated, “[T]he ދclassic taking [is one] in 
which the government directly appropriates private property for its 
own use.ތ”148 The Court considered whether the classical taking 
applies only to real property and not to personal property and 
concluded no, reasoning: 
                                                 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 2430. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. at 2433 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I 
agree with Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion. However, I cannot agree with the 
Court’s rejection, in Part III, of the Government’s final argument.”). 
 142. See id. at 2432 (majority opinion) (“The Government contends that the 
calculation [of compensation] must consider what the value of the reserve raisins 
would have been without the price support program . . . .”). 
 143. Id. at 2436 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 144. See id. at 2432 (majority opinion) (“The Court has repeatedly held that 
just compensation normally is to be measured by ‘the market value of the property at 
the time of the taking.’” (quoting United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 
(1984))). 
 145. See id. at 2425-28 (discussing the history of the Takings Clause). 
 146. See id. at 2427-28 (describing the difference between a direct 
appropriation of property and a land use restriction). 
 147. See id. at 2428 (“The reserve requirement imposed by the Raisin 
Committee is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are transferred from the growers 
to the Government. Title to the raisins passes to the Raisin Committee.”). 
 148. Id. at 2425 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 (2002)). 
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Nothing in the text or history of the Takings Clause, or our precedents, 
suggests that the rule is any different when it comes to appropriation of 
personal property. The Government has a categorical duty to pay just 
compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.149 
The Court discussed the history of the clause noting that it 
applies to “private property” without distinguishing different types of 
property.150 Moreover, the principle has origins at least 800 years old 
reflected in the Magna Carta of 1215, which “specifically protected 
agricultural crops from uncompensated takings.”151 The Court noted 
that the colonists brought the Magna Carta principles with them and 
specifically referenced early laws in the colonies of Massachusetts, 
Virginia, and South Carolina that prohibited governmental taking of 
agricultural goods or necessities without fair compensation.152 
Furthermore, early during the Revolutionary War, the New York 
Legislature adopted a law providing for compensation for the 
impressment of horses and carriages among other things.153 The 
Court wrote: 
According to the author of the first treatise on the Constitution, St. George 
Tucker, the Takings Clause was “probably” adopted in response to “the 
arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and 
other public uses, by impressment, as was too frequently practiced during 
the revolutionary war, without any compensation whatever.”154  
To further support the argument that the takings rule applies to 
personal property, the Court cited its 1882 decision in James v. 
Campbell, which concerned an alleged governmental appropriation 
of a patent and held that the government could no more use the 
patented invention without just compensation than it could use 
private land.155 
The Court attributed confusion about the Takings Clause to 
more modern times.156 Prior to 1922, the Takings Clause “was 
                                                 
 149. Id. at 2426. 
 150. See id. (“It protects ‘private property’ without any distinction between 
different types.”). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 305-06 app. 
(1803)). 
 155. Id. at 2427 (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)). 
 156. See id. (“The Ninth Circuit based its distinction between real and 
personal property on this Court’s discussion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), a case involving extensive limitations on the use of 
shorefront property.”). 
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understood to provide protection only against a direct appropriation 
of property—personal or real.”157 In 1922, the Court decided the 
well-known and often cited Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, which 
held that a use restriction on property that went too far could be a 
“regulatory taking” requiring compensation.158 In Pennsylvania Coal, 
the company held mining rights.159 The Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania passed a law that effectively barred mining underneath 
structures, which made the company’s land interest worthless, and 
the Court held that the law was an unconstitutional taking.160 Justice 
Holmes wrote the majority opinion and noted, “[W]hile property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will 
be recognized as a taking.”161 
The present Court observed that there have been some 
distinctions between real property and personal property in the 
context of regulatory takings, but concluded, “The different 
treatment of real and personal property in a regulatory case suggested 
by Lucas did not alter the established rule of treating direct 
appropriations of real and personal property alike.”162 Lucas was the 
1992 case that decided that a regulation prohibiting building on 
beachfront property could be a taking.163 The Court also cited its 
language in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council stating that it is 
“inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling 
precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a 
‘regulatory taking,’ and vice versa.”164  
The distinction between a per se taking and a regulatory taking 
is that a regulatory taking requires an analysis of whether the 
interference in the property right goes too far, whereas a direct 
appropriation of property does not require any such analysis.165 
                                                 
 157. Id. 
 158. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 159. Id. at 412. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 415. 
 162. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427-28 (2015). 
 163. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) 
(“[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all 
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his 
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”). 
 164. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2428 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002)). 
 165. See id. at 2427 (“Our cases have stressed the ‘longstanding distinction’ 
between government acquisitions of property and regulations . . . .” (quoting Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 323)). 
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Oddly enough, both sides rely on the 1982 Loretto decision to 
support their theories.166 There the Court invalidated a statute that 
required landlords to permit cable television companies to install 
equipment on the landlords’ premises.167 Although the occupation 
was small, no inquiry into whether the taking went too far was 
permitted because it involved a physical taking of real property.168 
The Horne majority wrote, “That reasoning—both with respect to 
history and logic—is equally applicable to a physical appropriation 
of personal property.”169 On the other hand, Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissenting opinion argued that the Loretto rule does not apply when 
the property owner continues to retain “some property right” such as 
the right to the net proceeds of the reserve raisins.170 
The majority countered this argument with the argument that 
title to the reserve raisins passed to the Raisin Committee.171 The 
Committee was permitted to dispose of the raisins as it wished as 
long as it was consistent with the purposes of the USDA’s marketing 
order.172 The majority wrote: 
Raisin growers subject to the reserve requirement thus lose the entire 
“bundle” of property rights in the appropriated raisins—“the rights to 
possess, use and dispose of” them—with the exception of the speculative 
hope that some residual proceeds may be left when the Government is 
done with the raisins and has deducted the expenses of implementing all 
aspects of the marketing order.173 
The Court viewed this as an unquestionable direct 
appropriation and per se taking.174 The Court next addressed the 
question as to whether the compensation requirement in a taking can 
                                                 
 166. Compare id. at 2426 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-35 (1982), to support the proposition that an appropriation 
of real property is a per se taking requiring just compensation), with id. at 2437 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435, for the proposition that a 
per se taking requires the destruction of all rights). 
 167. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438-39. 
 168. See id. at 436 (“[C]onstitutional protection for the rights of private 
property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied.”). 
 169. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 170. Id. at 2437-39 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 171. See id. at 2428 (majority opinion). 
 172. See id. (“The Committee disposes of what become its raisins as it 
wishes, to promote the purposes of the raisin marketing order.”). 
 173. Id. (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435). 
 174. See id. (“The Government’s formal demand that the Hornes turn over a 
percentage of their raisin crop without charge, for the Government’s control and use, 
is ‘of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a 
court might ordinarily examine.’” (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432)). 
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be avoided “by reserving to the property owner a contingent interest 
in a portion of the value of the property, set at the government’s 
discretion.”175 The Court’s simple answer was no, again relying on 
the reasoning in Loretto.176 When there has been a physical taking of 
the property, there is no inquiry into the extent of the reduction in 
value.177 Although the underlying intrusion in the Loretto case was 
small—installation of a small cable box on the roof of a large 
apartment building—it constituted a per se taking, which 
constitutionally invokes a compensation requirement.178 Here in 
Horne, the government’s possession of the reserve raisins renders 
any argument that the Hornes retained a partial interest in the 
property irrelevant.179 Even the three Justices who dissented in part 
agreed with this portion of the Court’s analysis.180 According to all 
but one Justice, once there has been a physical appropriation of the 
property, any analysis based on regulatory takings is irrelevant other 
than for a determination of the magnitude of compensation.181 
Compensation is required in order for the taking to be 
constitutional.182 And because the raisin reserve program is 
                                                 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. at 2428-29 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430, 436) (“For example, 
in Loretto, we held that the installation of a cable box on a small corner of Loretto’s 
rooftop was a per se taking, even though she could of course still sell and 
economically benefit from the property.”). 
 177. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (“When the government physically takes possession of an 
interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate 
the former owner, regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an 
entire parcel or merely a part thereof.” (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 
U.S. 114, 115 (1951))). 
 178. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37 (“[C]onstitutional protection for the 
rights of private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area 
permanently occupied.”). 
 179. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2429 (“[W]hen there has been a physical 
appropriation, ‘we do not ask . . . whether it deprives the owner of all economically 
valuable use’ of the item taken.” (alteration in original) (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 
Council, 535 U.S. at 323)). 
 180. See id. at 2433 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I 
agree with Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion.”). 
 181. See id. (questioning only the calculation of just compensation). 
 182. See id. at 2426 (majority opinion) (“The Government has a categorical 
duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your 
home.”). 
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unconstitutional, the fines levied for violation of the program are 
unenforceable.183 
The third question considered by the Court was “[w]hether a 
governmental mandate to relinquish specific, identifiable property as 
a ‘condition’ on permission to engage in commerce effects a per se 
taking.”184 The Court answered that in the case before it, the answer 
was yes.185 The argument advanced by the government was that the 
raisin reserve requirement was not a taking because the Hornes 
voluntarily chose to grow raisins, and they had the option to grow 
some other crop instead if they did not like the requirement.186 Thus, 
there was an argument that this was merely a condition on the 
government’s grant of permission to use the Hornes’ land to grow 
raisins.187 
The Court was not impressed with this argument, observing 
that a similar argument was advanced and rejected in Loretto.188 
There it had been argued that if landlords did not want cable boxes 
installed on their property, they could cease renting their units.189 The 
Loretto Court held that “a landlord’s ability to rent his property may 
not be conditioned on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a 
physical occupation.”190 The Court explained that a contrary holding 
would simply go too far: 
                                                 
 183. See id. at 2433 (“[T]he Hornes should simply be relieved of the 
obligation to pay the fine and associated civil penalty they were assessed when they 
resisted the Government’s effort to take their raisins.”). 
 184. Id. at 2430. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 32, Horne, 135 S. Ct. 2419 
(2015) (No. 14-275)). 
 187. See id. (“[A] landlord’s ability to rent his property may not be 
conditioned on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical occupation.” 
(quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 n.17 
(1982))). 
 188. See id. (“In Loretto, we rejected the argument that the New York law 
was not a taking because a landlord could avoid the requirement by ceasing to be a 
landlord.”). 
 189. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439 n.17. The Court observed: 
Teleprompter notes that the law applies only to buildings used as rental 
property, and draws the conclusion that the law is simply a permissible 
regulation of the use of real property. We fail to see, however, why a 
physical occupation of one type of property but not another type is any 
less a physical occupation.  
Id. at 438-39. 
 190. Id. at 439 n.17. 
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For example, it would allow the government to require a landlord to 
devote a substantial portion of his building to vending and washing 
machines, with all profits to be retained by the owners of these services 
and with no compensation for the deprivation of space. It would even 
allow the government to requisition a certain number of apartments as 
permanent government offices.191 
The Court observed that the dissent and government both relied 
heavily on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., which held that the 
Environmental Protection Agency could require companies to 
disclose information, including trade secrets, as a condition of being 
allowed to sell dangerous chemicals.192 The Court summarily 
dismissed the application of this case stating,  
The taking here cannot reasonably be characterized as part of a similar 
voluntary exchange. In one of the years at issue here, the Government 
insisted that the Hornes turn over 47 percent of their raisin crop, in 
exchange for the “benefit” of being allowed to sell the remaining 53 
percent. The next year, the toll was 30 percent. We have already rejected 
the idea that Monsanto may be extended by regarding basic and familiar 
uses of property as a “Government benefit” on the same order as a permit 
to sell hazardous chemicals. Selling produce in interstate commerce, 
although certainly subject to reasonable government regulation, is 
similarly not a special governmental benefit that the Government may 
hold hostage, to be ransomed by the waiver of constitutional protection. 
Raisins are not dangerous pesticides; they are a healthy snack. A case 
about conditioning the sale of hazardous substances on disclosure of 
health, safety, and environmental information related to those hazards is 
hardly on point.193 
The fourth and final argument considered by the Court was that 
the case should be remanded for a calculation as to what the Hornes’ 
raisins would have been worth without the raisin reserve program.194 
The government’s argument here was that the benefit the Hornes 
received from a higher price for their free-tonnage raisins likely (it 
was asserted without any evidence) exceeded the value that the entire 
raisin crop (reserve and free-tonnage combined) would have been 
worth without the raisin reserve program.195 On this point, the Court 
split 5–4.196 
                                                 
 191. Id. 
 192. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2430 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 
U.S. 985, 1008 (1984)). 
 193. Id. at 2430-31. 
 194. See id. at 2431-32 (“Finally, the Government briefly argues that if we 
conclude that the reserve requirement effects a taking, we should remand for the 
Court of Appeals to calculate [compensation] . . . .”). 
 195. See id. at 2432 (“The Government contends that the calculation must 
consider what the value of the reserve raisins would have been without the price 
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The majority dismissed this argument, noting that the 
government cited no precedent for this hypothetical approach “or its 
notion that general regulatory activity such as enforcement of quality 
standards can constitute just compensation for a specific physical 
taking.”197 The majority did note that the dissenting opinions cited 
cases with some concern that Horne might limit a condemning 
authority’s ability to offset compensation for a partial taking by 
deducting the increased value for the remaining property, for 
example, when land is taken to construct a road which makes the 
remaining land more valuable by virtue of its accessibility.198 The 
majority dismissed these cases as being off point and not creating 
any exception to the general rule that the appropriate measure of 
compensation in a per se taking is the fair market value at the time of 
the taking.199 The majority also refuted the dissenting opinions with 
the observation that the government did not cite any of their cases, 
which further suggests that they are not on point.200 
The majority’s most compelling argument on this point was its 
simplest argument. The Court quoted itself: “The Court has 
repeatedly held that just compensation normally is to be measured by 
‘the market value of the property at the time of the taking.’”201 
Furthermore, the government set the market value of the taken 
property when it assessed the Hornes with a fine.202 The Court said, 
“The Government cannot now disavow that valuation.”203 The 
majority concluded: 
There is accordingly no need for a remand; the Hornes should simply be 
relieved of the obligation to pay the fine and associated civil penalty they 
were assessed when they resisted the Government’s effort to take their 
raisins. This case, in litigation for more than a decade, has gone on long 
enough.204 
                                                                                                       
support program . . . [A]ccording to the Government, the Hornes would ‘likely’ have 
a net gain under this theory.” (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 56, Horne, 135 
S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (No. 14-275))). 
 196. See generally id. at 2423-43 (majority opinion joined by five Justices, 
partial dissent of three Justices dissenting on this point, and dissent of Justice 
Sotomayor). 
 197. Id. at 2432. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Id. (quoting United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984)). 
 202. See id. at 2433. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sotomayor dissented from all of the majority’s 
holdings.205 She first argued that the raisin reserve requirement 
should not be seen as a taking of the raisins, but rather as a use 
restriction on the land used to produce the raisins.206 Based on this 
view of the substance of the transactions, she would have upheld the 
raisin reserve program as a regulatory use restriction.207 She 
essentially argued that because the government could achieve its goal 
by restricting the growing of raisins, it should also be able to take a 
portion of the crop.208 Justice Sotomayor wrote: 
[W]hat makes the Court’s twisting of the doctrine even more baffling is 
that it ultimately instructs the Government that it can permissibly achieve 
its market control goals by imposing a quota without offering raisin 
producers a way of reaping any return whatsoever on the raisins they 
cannot sell. I have trouble understanding why anyone would prefer that.209 
The majority retorted: 
A physical taking of raisins and a regulatory limit on production may have 
the same economic impact on a grower. The Constitution, however, is 
concerned with means as well as ends. The Government has broad powers, 
but the means it uses to achieve its ends must be “consist[ent] with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution.”210 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent also argued vociferously that no 
per se taking of the raisins occurred because the Hornes retained a 
                                                 
 205. See id. at 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I would affirm the 
judgment of the Ninth Circuit.”).  
 206. See id. at 2440 (“[T]he government may require certain property rights 
to be given up as a condition of entry into a regulated market without effecting a per
se taking.”). 
 207. See id. at 2441 (“[T]he Government may condition the ability to offer 
goods in the market on the giving-up of certain property interests without effecting a 
per se taking. The [Raisin] Order is a similar regulation.”). 
 208. See id. at 2443. Justice Sotomayor wrote: 
The Hornes and the Court both concede that a cap on the quantity of 
raisins that the Hornes can sell would not be a per se taking. . . . I know of 
no principle, however, providing that if the Government achieves a 
permissible regulatory end by asking regulated individuals or entities to 
physically move the property subject to the regulation, it has committed a 
per se taking rather than a potential regulatory taking. 
Id.
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 2428 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).  
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right to net proceeds from the reserve raisins.211 She argued that if 
any right was retained, however small, no direct appropriation of 
property has occurred.212 This is an implausible argument because it 
implies that the government could appropriate any property if it 
leaves with the owner the right to collect one dollar per year in rent 
in perpetuity.213 Surely we have not endured more than 200 years of 
constitutional jurisprudence to only just learn that the Takings Clause 
can be so easily circumvented. In short, it is very difficult to 
reconcile Justice Sotomayor’s views that the law in Loretto requiring 
landlords to permit cable companies to install equipment on their 
rooftops is a taking, but that the taking of a large portion of a raisin 
crop with a speculative contingent interest in the net proceeds is not 
a taking. 
D. The Partial Dissent
Justice Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part with whom Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined.214 
They agreed with the majority on the first three questions—that the 
reserve requirement is a taking requiring just compensation rather 
than a regulatory restriction, that compensation cannot be avoided by 
providing a contingent interest, and that the government cannot 
condition the Hornes’ right to grow and sell raisins on surrendering a 
portion of the crop.215 They disagreed with the fourth issue, whether 
the higher value that the Hornes received for their free-tonnage 
raisins through the reserve program could provide the just 
compensation required for the raisins taken.216 
                                                 
 211. See id. at 2438-39 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Hornes, however, 
retain at least one meaningful property interest in the reserve raisins: the right to 
receive some money for their disposition.”). 
 212. See id. at 2440 (“The fact that at least one property right is not 
destroyed by the Order is alone sufficient to hold that this case does not fall within 
the narrow confines of Loretto.”). 
 213. Cf. id. at 2439 (“Granted, this equitable distribution may represent less 
income than what some or all of the reserve raisins could fetch if sold in an 
unregulated market. In some years, it may even turn out (and has turned out) to 
represent no net income.”). 
 214. Id. at 2433 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 215. See id. (“I agree with Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion.”). 
 216. See id. (“The Government contends that we should remand the case for 
a determination of whether any compensation would have been due if the Hornes 
had complied with the California Raisin Marketing Order’s reserve requirement. In 
my view, a remand for such a determination is necessary.”). 
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These Justices cited cases involving partial takings where the 
government took a portion of a parcel of land, and in calculating the 
just compensation constitutionally required, the government was 
entitled to offset any enhanced value in the land not taken.217 
Examples include taking land for the construction of roads or 
waterways or flood control, which left the untaken land improved 
and more valuable.218 The difference between Justice Breyer’s 
analysis and Justice Roberts’s is that Justice Breyer viewed the raisin 
reserve requirement as a partial taking of the entire raisin crop, 
whereas Justice Roberts viewed it as a complete taking of the reserve 
raisins.219 Given that raisins are a fungible good and lack the 
attributes of real property,220 I would argue that Justice Roberts has 
the more logical view. Certainly his perspective simplifies the law 
and keeps the calculations realistic rather than hypothetical and 
speculative.221 
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HORNE 
A. The Private Nature of Price Supports 
As far as economic policy goes, the raisin reserve program is 
bad policy.222 It is a price support program intended to benefit raisin 
growers at the expense of consumers.223 It creates a wedge between 
                                                 
 217. See id. at 2434-35.
 218. See id. 
 219. Compare id. at 2434 (“When the Government takes as reserve raisins a 
percentage of the annual crop, the raisin owners retain the remaining, free-tonnage, 
raisins.”), with id. at 2428 (majority opinion) (“Raisin growers subject to the reserve 
requirement thus lose the entire ‘bundle’ of property rights in the appropriated 
raisins . . . .”). 
 220. See id. at 2439 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he property at issue is a 
fungible commodity for sale . . . .”).  
 221. See id. at 2432 (majority opinion) (“[O]ur cases have set forth a clear 
and administrable rule for just compensation . . . .”). 
 222. See STIGLITZ, supra note 13, at 113. Professor Stiglitz writes: 
[A]s powerful as governments may be, they can no more repeal the law of 
supply and demand than they can repeal the law of gravity. When they 
interfere with its working, the forces of supply and demand will not be 
balanced. There will either be excess supply or excess demand. Shortages 
and surpluses create problems of their own, often worse than the original 
problem the government was supposed to resolve. 
Id. 
 223. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2434 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The reserve requirement is intended, at least in part, to enhance 
the price that free-tonnage raisins will fetch on the open market.”).  
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the marginal cost of the last raisin produced and the marginal value 
of the last raisin consumed that prevents the achievement of a Pareto 
efficient equilibrium.224 Hence, the resulting allocation is not Pareto 
efficient and there are wasted resources.225 In other words, consumers 
lose more than raisin producers gain.226 It is analogous to transferring 
wealth from consumers to producers, using a leaking bucket to do 
so.227 
Economic policy does not trump the law.228 But our law is 
deeply rooted in economic theory.229 Contract law has developed 
based on the axiom that free markets and freedom to contract 
increase prosperity.230 Good law is consistent with good economic 
policy, and good law is inconsistent with bad economic policy.231 As 
Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurring opinion, the Court had 
                                                 
 224. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 110 (“[T]he price floor has 
caused the marginal benefit of the last bushel of wheat [consumed] to be greater than 
the marginal cost of producing it.”).  
 225. See id. (“We can conclude that a price floor reduces economic 
efficiency.”).  
 226. See id. (describing the deadweight loss resulting from consumers losing 
more than what farmers gain). 
 227. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 
91 (1975) (drawing the analogy of the tradeoff to taking from the poor to give to the 
rich, but carrying the money in a leaky bucket; the amount of leakage is the loss in 
efficiency). 
 228. See, e.g., Irma S. Russell, The Scholarship of Cass Sunstein: Measure 
for Measure: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Policy, 43 TULSA L. REV. 
891, 919 (2008) (“The existence of an economic template does not trump laws, and 
laws often include judgments about moral choice. Economics does not deprive 
sources of law of the power to alter the cost-benefit analysis.”).  
 229. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 
277-79 (6th ed. 2012) (describing the economic foundations of contract law). 
 230. Cf. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 25-26 (5th ed. 1789). Mr. Smith wrote: 
Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this: Give 
me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the 
meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from 
one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in 
need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest. 
Id. 
 231. Cf. Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad 
Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 
J.L. & POL’Y 641, 717 (2004) (“Law and economics is supposed to be able to predict 
and thus produce good policy for society, giving the supposed justification for courts 
operating from an ex ante perspective informed by economic reality to create 
policy.”).  
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an opportunity to more closely align the law with good economic 
policy by tying the constitutionality of takings with the requirement 
that there be a public use, and he noted that keeping the price of an 
agricultural commodity artificially high certainly contains no public 
benefit.232 The raisin reserve program was intended to confer a 
private benefit on a narrow class at public expense.233 As Justice 
Thomas wrote: 
The Takings Clause prohibits the government from taking private property 
except “for public use,” even when it offers “just compensation.” That 
requirement, as originally understood, imposes a meaningful constraint on 
the power of the state . . . . It is far from clear that the Raisin 
Administrative Committee’s conduct meets that standard. It takes the 
raisins of citizens and, among other things, gives them away or sells them 
to exporters, foreign importers, and foreign governments.234 
There is another important economic point to be made 
regarding the partial dissent written by Justice Breyer. He would 
uphold the constitutionality of the raisin reserve program precisely 
when it would be most disruptive to markets. To see this, it is useful 
to understand the economist’s concept of elasticity. The demand for 
a good is said to be relatively elastic when a small change in price 
causes a large change in the quantity demanded,235 and the good is 
inelastic if a large change in price causes only a small change in 
quantity demanded.236 Gasoline is a standard example of an inelastic 
good.237 Justice Breyer thought that the case should be remanded to 
assess what the Hornes would have earned without price supports.238 
                                                 
232. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (explaining why the government’s taking of the raisins is not for a 
public use).  
 233. See id. (“To the extent that the Committee is not taking the raisins ‘for 
public use,’ having the Court of Appeals calculate ‘just compensation’ in this case 
would be a fruitless exercise.”). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See VARIAN, supra note 34, at 276 (“An elastic demand curve is one for 
which the quantity demanded is very responsive to price . . . .”).  
 236. See id. (explaining that demand is inelastic when the percentage change 
in demand is less than the percentage change in price). 
 237. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 190 (explaining that 
increasing the tax on gasoline will increase tax revenue because demand for gasoline 
is inelastic).  
 238. The only way the Hornes could be better off with the price support is if 
their revenue for selling a smaller quantity of raisins at a higher price is larger. This 
can only happen if the demand curve is inelastic. See VARIAN, supra note 34, at 279 
(“Thus revenue increases when price increases if the elasticity of demand is less 
than 1 in absolute value.”).  
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But Breyer’s reasoning would tend to uphold takings based on the 
elasticity of the goods: the more inelastic the good, the more likely 
the taking would be upheld. Yet the more inelastic the good, the 
more government interference with prices disrupts the market.239  
Assume that Justice Breyer’s arguments had prevailed and the 
case was remanded for a factual determination of the question as to 
whether the higher price received for free-tonnage raisins more than 
offset the loss in the value of the reserve raisins. To keep the 
arithmetic simple, suppose that the reserve raisin requirement was 
50% and that the court found that market prices under the program 
were more than double what they would be without the program. By 
obtaining prices that are more than twice as high for half the crop, 
the growers are better off with the program. But what kind of policy 
sense does such an outcome make? Clearly, it makes no sense at all. 
As an aside, it is highly unlikely that raisins are this inelastic as there 
are plenty of other foods for people to eat.240 Reducing the quantity 
available on the market will increase the price, but not by so much 
that the increased revenue from the higher price will more than offset 
the lost revenue from the reserve raisins.241  
B. Antitrust Analogies
If the raisin growers were to collude to withhold raisins from 
the market to inflate prices, then we would have a clear violation of 
the antitrust laws.242 It is not rational to permit the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture to enable raisin growers to do something that would 
clearly be illegal if they did it on their own.243  
This brings us to the most compelling economic argument 
against the raisin reserve program—it is a government created 
                                                 
 239. See generally id. at 279-80 (describing how the 1979 United Farm 
Workers strike resulted in a 50% reduction in supply but a 400% increase in price). 
 240. See id. at 277 (“If a good has many close substitutes, we would expect 
that its demand curve would be very responsive to its price changes.”). 
 241. See id. at 279 (“[R]evenue decreases when price increases if the 
elasticity of demand is greater than 1 in absolute value.”). 
 242. See STIGLITZ, supra note 13, at 366 (“[B]oth state and federal 
governments have passed antitrust laws prohibiting collusive behavior. This makes 
it impossible for firms to get together and sign legally binding contracts that would 
require each firm to keep output low and prices high.”).  
 243. Cf. id. (describing how removal of New York state government 
protection of New York dairy producers benefited New York’s public consumers). 
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monopoly.244 Why do the antitrust laws exist? They exist to protect 
consumers from the exercise of monopoly power.245 There is no 
rational argument that creating a monopoly in the raisin market 
benefits the public.246 This is far worse than the government intruding 
on the interests of the few to protect the interests of the many. This is 
the government intruding on the interests of many consumers to 
protect the interests of a few raisin growers.247 When examining the 
big picture of what the raisin reserve requirement is actually doing, it 
is baffling that Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor 
would uphold the program. These programs are bad policy.248 They 
are designed to injure the consumer in order to enrich the 
                                                 
 244. Cf. D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government 
Interventions that Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 120 (2009) 
(“[G]overnment-created monopoly immunizes the company from antitrust law even 
though it can abuse its monopoly position in the market to hurt consumers. This 
behavior, in turn, produces significant negative externalities that may worsen the 
very problems that antitrust law, now forced to take a backseat to other government 
regulatory schemes, was intended to address.”).
 245. See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 
(1966). Justice Black wrote: 
From this country’s beginning there has been an abiding and widespread 
fear of the evils which flow from monopoly—that is the concentration of 
economic power in the hands of a few. On the basis of this fear, Congress 
in 1890, when many of the Nation’s industries were already concentrated 
into what it deemed too few hands, passed the Sherman Act in an attempt 
to prevent further concentration and to preserve competition among a large 
number of sellers. 
Id. 
 246. Cf. Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 243-44 (2000). Professor Semeraro writes: 
A wide range of government programs . . . may be inefficient, including 
price support programs, government created monopolies, minimum wage 
laws, trade quotas, and patent grants. All of this government conduct 
produces precisely the type of harm the antitrust laws are intended to 
prevent: “The consumer pays more than the competitive price regardless 
of whether the market is distorted by a private, profiteering cartel or a 
state-sanctioned (and presumptively ‘public-spirited’) cartel.” 
Id. (quoting David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action 
and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
293, 330 (1994)). 
 247. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (explaining that there is no public purpose in taking the raisins). 
 248. See DOLAN, supra note 101, at 496 (“Neither price supports nor acreage 
controls offer much to consumers but the prospect of spending more and getting 
less.”). 
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producers.249 They are inconsistent with fundamental American 
values favoring free honest markets and consumer protection. The 
government has no rational purpose in hurting consumers to enrich 
producers.250 
To understand why monopolization of markets is so damaging 
to Pareto efficiency, one has to understand the difference between 
competitive market equilibrium and the equilibrium that results when 
a market is monopolized. All sellers will seek to maximize profits 
whether they are large monopolists or small individuals.251 The 
necessary mathematical first order condition for profit maximization 
is that marginal revenue equals marginal cost.252 If marginal revenue 
exceeds marginal cost, then profits can be increased by selling more, 
and if marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue, then profits can be 
increased by selling less.253  
In a competitive market, each agent is too small to have any 
noticeable impact on the market price.254 Therefore, each seller 
perceives the demand curve to be flat and perceives marginal 
revenue to equal price.255 For an individual seller to decide to sell 
more or less will have no impact on the price.256 As a result, in 
equilibrium marginal revenue equals marginal cost equals price.257 
                                                 
 249. See id. at 498 (“Administrative costs and misallocation of resources 
mean that for each dollar in cost to consumers, farmers gain only something like 40 
to 80 cents in real net profits.”). 
 250. See id. at 499 (“Marketing orders . . . enhance farm incomes but only at 
the expense of high consumer prices and wasteful misallocation of resources.”). 
 251. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 229, at 26 (“[F]irms maximize profits 
subject to the constraints imposed on them by consumer demand and the technology 
of production.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 252. See BROWN, supra note 63, at 291 (explaining that the fundamental rule 
for profit maximization, producing a quantity at which marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost, is the same for monopolists and competitive firms). 
 253. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 229, at 26 (“[W]hen marginal revenue 
exceeds marginal cost, the firm should expand production, and . . . when marginal 
cost exceeds marginal revenue, it should reduce production.”). 
 254. See BROWN, supra note 63, at 260 (“There are so many sellers that no 
one seller is large enough to influence price. . . . This is why competitive firms are 
said to be price takers. Purely competitive firms cannot set their selling price; they 
can only charge the price determined by supply and demand in the entire market.”). 
 255. See id. at 264 (“The demand (sales) curve facing a single firm under 
pure competition is perfectly horizontal because each firm produces such a small 
portion of industry output that it perceives that it can sell an unlimited quantity at the 
prevailing market price.”). 
 256. See id. at 260 (“[C]ompetitive firms are said to be price takers.”). 
 257. See id. at 267 (“This is important: for a pure competitive firm, marginal 
revenue is equal to selling price.”). 
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This then results in the situation depicted in Figure 4 with a 
consumer surplus equal to the shaded area.258 As explained earlier, 
the consumer surplus represents the difference between the value 
consumers place on the resources and the amount consumers pay for 
the resources.259 
 
Figure 4. Perfect Competition 
In contrast, a monopolist knows that selling more will lower 
the market price and selling less will raise the market price.260 The 
monopolist knows that his marginal revenue curve is downward 
sloping.261 Like any profit-maximizing firm, the monopolist produces 
the quantity that equates marginal revenue to marginal cost, but the 
monopolist is able to earn monopoly profits by charging a price that 
is well above marginal cost.262 The result is a lower quantity of the 
good, higher prices, and lower consumer surplus.263 This is seen in 
Figure 5. 
                                                 
 258. See Klock, supra note 60, at 324. 
 259. See id. at 324-35. 
 260. See id. at 325. 
 261. See STIGLITZ, supra note 13, at 338 (explaining that the monopolist’s 
demand curve is downward sloping). 
 262. See Klock, supra note 60, at 326 (“[F]or the monopolist . . . price does 
not equal marginal revenue, but is instead set higher according to the level that the 
market will bear.”).
 263. See id. 
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Figure 5. Monopoly 
The monopolist’s profit-maximizing output is Q2 where 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost, but price is set above that at 
P2.264 If the monopolist produced less at the level Q1 and charged 
more at the level P1, the incremental revenue received from charging 
a higher price would be less than the incremental revenue lost from 
selling a lower quantity.265 This can be seen by visually comparing 
the rectangles formed by the dashed lines. If the monopolist were 
instead a perfectly competitive firm, it would produce up to the point 
where marginal cost equals demand and the price would also equal 
marginal cost.266 
The evil of monopoly is that consumers place a greater value 
on the marginal unit than it would cost to produce it.267 This means 
that resources are not being put to their highest valued use, too little 
of the monopolist’s good is being produced, and the economy is not 
Pareto efficient.268 
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 states, “Every 
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part 
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
                                                 
 264. See id. at 325. 
 265. See id. (“The difference between the two rectangles is the marginal 
revenue associated with increasing output from Q1 to Q2.”). 
 266. See id. at 326 n.60 and accompanying text (discussing how a 
monopolist in a contestable market with costless reversible entry could produce and 
price the same as a perfect competitor).  
 267. See id. at 326 (“Most importantly, the value that society would place on 
additional output is greater than the cost to society of producing the output. In other 
words, the social gain from putting more resources into production of the product 
exceeds the cost.”). 
 268. Id. 
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nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”269 If monopoly is a 
felony to deter people from creating monopolies, it cannot be logical 
to allow a self-interested constituency to cause the government to 
create a monopoly on its behalf.270 
Justice Sotomayor asserted that it is baffling that the majority 
did not uphold the raisin reserve program when it conceded that the 
government could accomplish the same effect through the 
establishment of quotas.271 She asked why anyone would prefer 
that.272 I think the more appropriate question is why anyone would 
prefer either. We have antitrust laws to protect consumers from the 
evil of monopoly.273 What rational purpose can be served by allowing 
the government to do for raisin growers that which the antitrust laws 
prohibit the raisin growers from doing for themselves? Effectively, 
raisin growers are using the government to create a monopoly for 
them in order to control supply, prices, and profits. If the raisin 
growers did this for themselves, they could be prosecuted and even 
subjected to private class action treble damage liability.274 The raisin 
reserve program confers a private benefit on raisin growers at the 
public’s expense in exchange for political support of the 
government.275 Those who are upset by the decision in Citizens
United276 and claim that it amounts to the selling of our country 
should surely be as upset by programs, such as the raisin reserve, that 
sell private benefits at public expense for political support. Justice 
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Thomas was correct to emphasize in the context of Horne that a 
taking cannot be constitutional unless it is for a public purpose.277 
Keeping the price of raisins above the competitive market 
equilibrium is surely not a public purpose.278 It is giving consumer’s 
money to government-created monopolists.279 
In another case decided last term by the Supreme Court, North
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade 
Commission,280 the Court wrote the following about our federal 
antitrust law: 
Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market 
structures. In this regard it is “as important to the preservation of 
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is 
to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.” The antitrust 
laws declare a considered and decisive prohibition by the Federal 
Government of cartels, price fixing, and other combinations or practices 
that undermine the free market.281 
This case involved an effort by dentists to use the power of the 
state of North Carolina to prevent non-dentists from offering teeth 
whitening services at a lower cost than dentists charged.282 In the 
interest of protecting consumers against the monopoly power being 
exercised, the Federal Trade Commission took action against the 
dentists.283 The dentists responded with a claim of sovereign 
immunity under the doctrine of Parker.284 The Court was not 
sympathetic to the dentists and held that a nonsovereign could only 
                                                 
 277. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
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 280. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 1101. 
 281. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1109 (2015). 
 282. See id. at 1108. 
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 284. See id. at 1107 (“The question is whether the board’s actions are 
protected from Sherman Act regulation under the doctrine of state-action antitrust 
immunity, as defined and applied in this Court’s decisions beginning with Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943).”). 
752 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
claim immunity if it is regulated by the sovereign, which the board of 
dental examiners was not.285 
No antitrust claim was made in Horne because the cartel was 
created by an agency of the U.S. government.286 But under the 
Court’s analysis in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, 
it is clear that the state of California would not be able to create a 
similar Raisin Committee and allow it to run an unsupervised cartel 
as the U.S. Department of Agriculture was doing.287 If our antitrust 
policy makes good policy sense as I believe it does, it should not be 
something that can be easily undercut by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture any more than it cannot be undercut by the North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners. Justice Thomas was 
correct to point out that constitutional takings must have a public 
purpose, and there is no public purpose in keeping raisin prices 
above the competitive market equilibrium.288 Indeed, in the Hornes’ 
first appearance before the Court, Justice Breyer described the effect 
of the Raisin Marketing Order as “tak[ing] raisins that we grow, 
[and] in effect throw[ing] them in the river.”289 Clearly he saw no 
public purpose in such action. 
C. Public Choice
Public choice is the field of economics that applies economic 
analysis to politics.290 In the words of a leading scholar in the field, 
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“[p]ublic choice can be defined as the economic study of nonmarket 
decision making, or simply the application of economics to political 
science.”291 Institutions develop to benefit constituencies, and public 
choice theorists argue that more cohesive and powerful 
constituencies have the upper hand in gaining control over political 
institutions.292 For example, industry interests might successfully 
exert more influence over the Food and Drug Administration than 
pet owners because pet owners are not as cohesive and organized as 
industry interests. Under this view it is common to refer to 
government regulators as being captured by the industries they 
regulate.293 In the words of one commentator, “[r]egulation, formerly 
conceived of as a method of advancing public interest over private 
advantage, in many instances came to be conceived of as a method of 
subsidizing private interests at the expense of public good.”294  
An excerpt from a leading book in the field explains: 
In arguing that government intervention is needed to correct the failures of 
the market when public goods, externalities, and other sorts of impure 
private goods are present, the economics literature has often made the 
implicit assumptions that these failures could be corrected at zero cost. 
The government is seen as an omniscient and benevolent institution 
dictating taxes, subsidies, and quantities so as to achieve a Pareto-optimal 
allocation of resources. In the sixties, a large segment of the public choice 
literature began to challenge this “nirvana model” of government. This 
literature examines not how governments may or ought to behave, but how 
they do behave. It reveals that governments, too, can fail in certain 
ways.295 
A way in which governments can fail is spending more on a 
good than it is worth.296 For example, governments have the ability to 
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 296. See id. at 337 (discussing the possibility that rent seekers collectively 
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redistribute wealth.297 Self-interested groups might spend resources in 
an effort to get government to redistribute wealth in their favor.298 
Conflicting groups could collectively spend more than the amount 
being redistributed.299  
The pursuit of government-bestowed benefits has been termed 
rent seeking in the literature.300 Agricultural interests, seeking to 
obtain prices above the free market level for their produce, spend 
resources to obtain government subsidies or price supports and 
collect monopoly rents.301 The monopoly rents are a prize worth 
pursuing for those who might obtain them, but their existence creates 
economic inefficiency.302 As Professor Dennis Mueller discusses, 
“[E]ntrepreneurial rent seeking under competitive conditions more 
than fully dissipates all potential rents.”303 Professor Mueller further 
explains: 
In the regulatory process, producer and consumer interests are opposed. 
The higher the price that the regulators set, the bigger the monopoly rent 
rectangle going to the producers. Since regulation is a political 
bureaucratic process, it is reasonable to assume that the sellers of a 
regulated product place some pressure on the regulators to raise price and 
increase the size of the rectangle . . . . [This argument] draws attention to 
the rent-creating powers of regulators and the rent-seeking efforts of those 
regulated. 
. . . . 
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Although most regulated industries are not monopolies, the number of 
sellers is generally small. It is certainly small relative to the number of 
consumers. The costs of organizing the producers and the concentration of 
the benefits [is likely to make the change in votes from increasing the 
benefits to the regulated greater than the change in votes from increasing 
the benefits to consumers]. Stigler (1971) stresses this point in arguing that 
the main beneficiaries of regulation are the regulated firms. . . . By this 
argument, Peltzman helps to explain the ubiquitous regulation of 
agriculture around the world and other interventions in seemingly 
competitive industries like trucking and taxicabs in the United States.304 
An independent judiciary can curtail legislative efforts to use 
public powers to confer private benefits on a favored group.305 This is 
exactly what the Court did in the Horne decision, and they are to be 
commended for it. Justice Thomas is to be especially commended for 
observing the omission of any public purpose in the Agriculture 
Department’s raisin marketing order. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Horne, the Court properly held that government 
appropriation of chattel property is a taking that categorically 
requires just compensation in order to be constitutional.306 If the law 
authorizing the appropriation does not provide for compensation 
based on the fair market value at the time of the taking, the law is 
unconstitutional and cannot be enforced.307 Interestingly, only Justice 
Thomas made the point that takings, in addition to being 
compensated, must also be for a public purpose, and taking raisins 
for the purpose of diminishing the market supply and increasing the 
price to consumers serves no public purpose.308 
Economists are in agreement that price supports are bad 
policy.309 Economists also agree that antitrust policy, which deters 
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monopoly, is good policy.310 It is not logical to allow a small 
constituency to circumvent the antitrust laws by having the 
government create the equivalent of a cartel conspiracy to inflate 
prices to the public and enrich the small constituency. Justice 
Thomas’s concurring opinion provides a basis to challenge not only 
the wisdom of such policies, but also the legality of such policies. It 
is time to stop allowing small constituencies to manipulate the 
government to bestow private benefits at great public expense. 
Justice Thomas’s words could provide some leverage to contract 
these costly and irrational programs. 
                                                                                                       
“[e]conomic evidence suggests there are too many resources in American 
agriculture”). 
 310. See id. at 88 (showing modest consensus among economists with the 
proposition “[a]ntitrust laws should be enforced vigorously to reduce monopoly 
power from its current level”). 
